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Introduction
Merchandising of sports properties has become big business in
the United States. The American public's desire to associate them-
selves with their favorite sports teams and sports heroes has increased
the revenue generated by the sale of t-shirts, caps, and numerous
other products with team logos. The rapid and large increase in mer-
chandise revenue creates problems in determining how the revenue
should be distributed amongst the teams and raises questions as to
whether the current system for licensing logos and distributing profits
is the best system available.
Currently, the four major sports leagues-National Football
League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball
Association (NBA), and National Hockey League (NHL)-each li-
cense their individual team logos through a central licensing office and
split the royalty revenue evenly among the teams, with a few minor
exceptions. Is this the most effective system for merchandising team
logos? For a number of teams, shared revenue, a portion of which is
generated by the merchandise sales, can be the difference between
survival and economic failure. The nature and success of sports
leagues depends on the availability of competition between teams be-
cause it is the competition that cultivates fans and sells merchandise.
Revenue sharing helps to guarantee this competition.
There are potential antitrust implications of joint merchandising
agreements; sports leagues are an anomaly in the business world be-
cause they do not fit neatly into antitrust laws. The nature of sports
leagues has troubled courts for a number of years, and the characteri-
zation of a sports league can be outcome determinative in antitrust
litigation. Courts have rejected the theory that a sports league as a
whole should be viewed as a single entity, stating that even though
sports leagues possess some characteristics of a single entity, the com-
petition between the teams adds a competitive dimension to the
league, thereby preventing the league from being characterized as a
true single entity.'
This Note will explore the current merchandise licensing practices
of the four major sports leagues and the future of merchandise licens-
ing. Part I discusses the nature of sports properties. Part II discusses
current revenue sharing plans, the structure of sports leagues, and the
pros and cons of revenue sharing. Part III discusses the antitrust laws
and their application to sports leagues. The section addresses how
1. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984).
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and why the courts have treated baseball differently than the other
sports. Part IV explores the possible future of merchandise licensing
and the implications of Congressional involvement. The section ex-
amines the potentially disastrous outcome if joint agreements that vest
the right to license in one central company in each league are no
longer used and each team is left to license its own logo. This Note
concludes that revenue sharing is an essential element of sports




Sports merchandise properties include all items on the market
that contain team logos; the most successful are low-priced "impulse"
products.2 The licensing of sports properties is a big business because
fans want to identify with their favorite team or sports hero by wear-
ing a t-shirt, cap, or other article containing the team logo.'
Each sports team has a logo, consisting of a name, design, and
color scheme4 that represents the team and is easily identifiable by the
sports viewing public.5 The logo is a trademark and can be registered
with the Patent and Trademark Office on the Principal Register as a
mark for entertainment services in the form of professional sports
games.6 Team logos are placed on merchandise to indicate sponsor-
ship and authorization by the team represented by the logo.7 Each
team owns the trademark rights in the logo, including the right to li-
cense the logo.8
Theoretically, as a general business practice, each team would
have the right to exploit its own logo by manufacturing and distribut-
ing merchandise carrying the logo, keeping the profits derived from
the sale of such merchandise. However, since a team generally cannot
or does not want to manufacture a wide variety of products, an
2. Impulse products include t-shirts, toys, games, buttons, badges, patches, trading
cards, and other low-priced products. Charles W. Grimes & Gregory J. Battersby, The
Protection of Merchandising Properties, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 431, 434-35 (1979).
3. David M. Kelly, Comment, Trademarks: Protection of Merchandising Properties in
Professional Sports, 21 Duo. L. REV. 927, 929 (1983).
4. See NFL Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 327 N.E.2d 247, 249 (Ill.
App. 1975).
5. See NFL Properties, Inc. v. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 507, 511 (D.N.J.
1986).
6. NFL Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enter., 327 N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ill. App. 1975).
7. Id.
8. Dallas Cap, 327 N.E.2d at 249.
1995]
outside company must be granted a license to produce and sell the
products. 9
The four major sports-football, baseball, basketball, and
hockey-each pool their collective resources and have one arm of
each league handle the licensing for all teams within the league. Each
team authorizes its league's licensing entity to act as its licensing
agent. 10 There are, however, slight differences between the leagues in
the way the revenue is split and whether the licensing arm has the
exclusive right to handle all licensing matters or whether the teams
may also market merchandise on their own.
The central licensing agents, Major League Baseball Properties
(MLBP), National Football League Properties (NFLP), National Bas-
ketball Association Properties (NBAP), and National Hockey League
Properties (NHLP) operate through a licensing program which selects
companies to manufacture merchandise with the team logos and ar-
ranges for distribution and sale of the products.'1 Rather than requir-
ing each team to handle its own licensing, this joint approach allows
the central licensing agent to better control the quality of the mer-
chandise by approving and supervising "[tihe conception, design,
color combinations, production and distribution of all merchandise li-
censed to bear the marks .... "12 This produces a quality product that
favorably represents the league as a whole.
After manufacturing the merchandise, the licensee distributes the
merchandise through a number of different national and international
retail distribution channels. 3 Mail order, retail department stores,
and sporting goods stores are a few examples of such distribution
channels."4 These retail entities in turn sell the merchandise to the
general public.
The sale of licensed logo merchandise, such as caps, uniforms,
and jackets, is an important aspect of the sports business, and is re-
sponsible for a dramatic increase in league revenues, including some
9. Grimes & Battersby, supra note 2, at 436.
10. Dallas Cap, 327 N.E.2d at 249.
11. In addition, the licensing agent arranges for use of the logos by advertising agen-
cies in conjunction with approved promotions. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 F. Supp. at 511.
For example, logos are often used to help promote non-sports products, such as the use of
Michael Jordan wearing his Chicago Bulls uniform on a McDonalds drinking cup.
12. Id.
13. Sales of licensed team merchandise to European retailers has increased over the
past few years, and the success can be partially attributed to the increase in television
coverage of traditionally American sports. Sharon Tomkinson, Team Spirit; Team Licensed
Products; SGB International: European Report, SPORTING GOODS BUSINESS, Sept. 1993, at
8A1.
14. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 F. Supp. at 511.
HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J. [Vol. 18:219
FUTURE OF SPORTS MERCHANDISE LICENSING
individual team revenues. 15 For example, the revenue generated by a
baseball team from licensed merchandise grew at a rate of 11.7% per
year from 1971 to 1992.16 The rise has been just as dramatic in other
sports. 17 Moreover, despite shortened seasons in baseball and hockey
in 1994, sports merchandise sales in the United States and Canada
increased by 5% in 1994, due mainly to the first-half sales of baseball
and hockey merchandise and strong sales of NFL, NBA, and college
merchandise.' 8 Income for the leagues and the teams is derived from
the payment of royalties stemming from retail sales of the logo-bear-
ing merchandise. 9 Altough the royalty rates collected by the
leagues differ, the money generated from royalty revenues is a source
of shared revenues for each league.
II
Revenue Sharing
Revenue sharing is the practice of pooling together revenue from
agreed-upon sources and then distributing it, generally evenly, to indi-
vidual teams.2" The practice stems from the need to keep smaller
market teams, who do not have the resources to generate as much
revenue as large market teams, competitive and viable.2' The success
of teams in larger markets increases the revenue pool and allows those
teams in smaller markets access to more revenue than they could gen-
erate independently.22 For example, in 1991, the Seattle Mariners re-
ceived approximately 55.5% of their near-$36 million total revenues
from shared revenue sources.23 This increased revenue is used by the
15. Special Report: Licensed Sports Merchandise Scores Again, LICENSING LETTER,
Feb. 1994 [hereinafter Licensing Letter].
16. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS 58 (1992). The merchandise reve-
nues in Major League Baseball from 1992 to 1993 rose from $2.4 billion to $2.5 billion. The
strike-shortened season of 1994, however, produced decreased sales of licensed products-
$2.5 billion in 1993 to $2.1 billion in 1994 with a slightly lower total projected for 1995 and
1996. Steve Zipay, Baseball at the Break; Stores Are Hit By Slow Sales, NEWSDAY, July 9,
1995, at Sports 15.
17. In the NFL, revenues grew from $3 billion in 1993 to $3.15 billion in 1994. In the
NBA, the revenues increased from $2.2 billion in 1993 to $2.8 billion in 1994. Jeff Jensen,
Sports Marketing; NBA Lockout Slows Licensing Juggernaut, ADVERTISING AGE, July 17,
1995, at 6.
18. Special Report: Sports Licensing Grows by 5%, LICENSING LETTER, Mar. 1995.
19. See NFL Properties, Inc. v. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 F. Supp. at 511.
20. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1340 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
21. David M. Van Glish, The Future of Sports Broadcasting and Pay-Per-View-An
Antitrust Analysis, 1 SPORTS L.J. 79, 85 (1994).
22. Id.
23. ZIMBALIST, supra note 16, at 59.
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smaller market teams to field teams that are able to compete more
effectively with the larger market teams.24
The revenue from shared sources stems from the strength of joint
agreements. A joint agreement consists of the joining of all the teams
in a league for the purpose of negotiating as a single entity.25 This
practice produces more bargaining power for the league and allows
for the negotiation of stronger contracts.26
The pooling of revenues has generated controversy over the le-
gality of joint agreements and whether they really are necessary to the
survival of sports leagues. Many people within the industry believe
that joint agreements are necessary in order to maintain competitive
balance on the field as well as financial stability for each franchise. 7
"'One of the key things that a sports league needs' ... 'is unity of
purpose. It needs harmony .... When you have unity and harmony
and can move basically as one, you can have a successful sports
league.' 28 Others, however, argue that sports franchises are no dif-
ferent than any other form of business, and since the United States
operates as a market economy, a team that cannot survive on its own
revenue should cease to operate. 29 This view is overly simplistic, how-
ever, because the inherent characteristics of a sports league are differ-
ent from other forms of business and competition operates differently
in sports than in the traditional business arena.
A. League Structure
Sports leagues are similar to other businesses in that each team in
a league is owned and operated independently of the other teams in
the league, and all profits, losses, and capital expenditures are the re-
sponsibility of each individual owner.30 However, sports leagues are
different from other businesses in that while they contain separate
franchises, the teams share some of the revenues.31 Moreover, each
team is directly interested in the survival of other teams in the league
because economic survival of teams will ensure competition on the
field, which is directly relevant to the survival of the league as a
24. Van Glish, supra note 21.
25. Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1340-41.
26. Van Glish, supra note 21, at 98.
27. GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 13 (1989).
28. DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NFL 13 (1986).
29. Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S.
287 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 99 (1985) (statement of Gene Upshaw, Executive Director, National Football League
Players Association) [hereinafter Upshaw Statement].
30. Van Glish, supra note 21, at 89.
31. Id.
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whole.32 If strong competition among the teams ceases to exist, fans
will lose interest and the leagues will not survive.
To ensure a somewhat even playing field and to produce competi-
tion worth watching, the teams must agree on certain aspects of the
game which will be followed by all teams. For example, agreement as
to the scoring and playing rules, how many players each team will be
allowed to have, and the type of equipment that can be used must be
made by all teams in the league. 33 In addition to these basic agree-
ments, arrangements have been established to allow a league to oper-
ate as a single entity in which the profits generated are split equally
among all the teams.34 Such formal agreements give sports leagues
the characteristics of a cartel.3 1
Even though the teams join together for some decisions and
agreements, they compete directly with one another for media atten-
tion, coaching staff, front-office personnel, and players.36 Each team
makes independent management decisions in direct competition with
other teams to develop the best team on the playing field.37 The
league's survival depends on the competition generated amongst the
teams on the playing field, and the relative strength of each team on
the playing field is determined by each owner's ability to generate and
use the financial resources required to support a winning team.38 The
creativity and entrepreneurship of individual team management will,
to some extent, determine whether each team survives or collapses.
B. Current Revenue Sharing Plans
Each league and its members determine the manner in which
leagues share revenue. The extent to which teams share revenues,
however, differs substantially between the leagues. There is a signifi-
cant difference between football, which has the most extensive reve-
nue sharing system, and hockey, which currently has the least
extensive revenue sharing system. Although both leagues share mer-
chandise royalty revenue equally among the teams, there are slight
differences in the manner in which each league allows its individual
32. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity
Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IrND. L.J. 25, 32-33 (1991).
33. SCULLY, supra note 27, at 13.
34. Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1340.
35. Id. A cartel is "[a] combination of producers of any product joined together to
control its production, sale, and price, so as to obtain a monopoly and restrict competition
in any particular industry or commodity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (6th ed. 1990).
36. Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1341.
37. Van Glish, supra note 21, at 89.
38. See SCULLY, supra note 27, at 75.
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teams to participate in the marketing of their own merchandise. As
for other shared revenue sources, each league has developed its own
approach.
1. National Football League (NFL)
The NFL currently has the most extensive revenue sharing plan
of all the major sports leagues. Each team derives up to 95% of its
revenue from shared sources.39
Revenue derived from merchandising properties is shared evenly
among the thirty teams.4 0 Because the teams share revenue derived
from the sale of merchandise, a "hot" team does not have a significant
economic advantage, in terms of merchandising revenue, over other
teams. 41 For example, the popularity of the Dallas Cowboys accounts
for approximately 30% of the revenue derived from NFL merchandise
sales, 42 which totaled approximately $3 billion in 1994.43 However,
the Cowboys do not receive 30% of the total royalty revenue; they
receive only 1/30th of the total royalty revenue, which is the same per-
centage that a team whose merchandise does not sell well receives."4
Under the current merchandise licensing system, there is no economic
incentive (in terms of merchandizing revenue) to field a winning team
since a winning team will receive the same amount of merchandizing
money as a losing team.
In terms of television revenues, each team receives 1/30th of the
revenue generated from the licensing of network broadcast rights.45
All television rights deals are negotiated collectively, and each indi-
vidual team is prohibited from negotiating its own television contracts,
39. See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1341.
40. Nick Cardofo, Patriots Are Scoring With Selling Points, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30,
1994, at 62. In 1994, there were 28 teams in the league. However, 2 expansion teams have
been added to the NFL league beginning in the 1995 season: the Carolina Panthers and the
Jacksonville Jaguars. Sheldon Mickles, Expansion Teams Off to a Good Start, THE ADVO-
CATE, July 17, 1995, at 1D.
41. Id.
42. Dan McGraw, The Very Lonesome Cowboy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 26,
1994, at 74.
43. Licensing Letter, supra note 15.
44. See Cardofo, supra note 40, at 62. In 1994, the royalty revenue from each NFL
team was approximately $3.5 million. Steve Zipay, Dallas Oilman's NFL Gusher, NEws-
DAY, Sept. 22, 1995, at A88.
45. Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports: Oversight Hearings on H.R. 823, H.R.
3287, and H.R. 6467 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 36 (1982)
(statement of Edward R. Garvey, Executive Director, National Football League Players
Ass'n) [hereinafter Garvey Statement].
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with the exception of some pre-season games. a6 Football differs from
baseball and basketball in that football teams have no opportunity to
derive additional revenue from local television contracts.
2. Major League Baseball (MLB)
While the income derived from revenue sharing sources in MLB
is significantly less than the percentage of shared revenue in football,
it is nevertheless substantial. In 1991, shared revenue income ac-
counted for approximately 36.5% of an average American League
team's income and 34.9% of an average National League team's in-
come. 47 The royalty revenue derived from merchandise licensing, mi-
nus MLBP's management costs, is placed in a Major League Baseball
general fund that the teams share equally.48 Individual teams, how-
ever, can supplement their merchandise revenue by selling game sou-
venirs, such as cracked bats and balls used in a game.49
Revenues from licensing of national broadcasting rights are split
evenly among the teams, but each team currently keeps revenues from
the licensing of its local broadcasting rights, with the exception of a
small amount from local pay-television and superstation 50 receipts. 51
MLB negotiates for nationally televised games as a single entity.
However, each team is free to negotiate its own local contract.52 The
league, however, regulates those games broadcast on superstations by
imposing a tax on the broadcast rather than restricting the number of
games that can be broadcast.53 MLB's taxing of superstation broad-
casts differs from regulation in the other leagues, to the extent that
there is either a limit to the number of games that a team may place
on local television or superstations, as in basketball, or the individual
teams cannot negotiate their own local contracts, as in football.
MLB's regulation of superstation contracts increases the revenue an
individual team may receive, but does not significantly diminish the
shared revenue that a team whose market would not support a signifi-
cant local contract may receive.
46. Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1343.
47. ZIMBALIST, supra note 16, at 59.
48. Id. at 58.
49. See id.
50. Superstations are defined as "independent, over-the-air television stations that
broadcast in their local market areas and are also carried by cable systems to other parts of
the country. WTBS in Atlanta, WGN TV in Chicago and WWOR in New York are all
examples of superstations." Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1338.
51. ZIMBALIST, supra note 16, at 150.
52. Professional Sports and the Law: A Study by the Select Committee on Professional
Sports House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976).
53. Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1343.
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3. National Hockey League (NHL)
The NHL handles its merchandise licensing much like the other
sports leagues in that the league has a licensing arm that licenses man-
ufacturers to produce the merchandise with team logos for all twenty-
six teams.54 A percentage of the royalty revenue generated from the
sale of the licensed merchandise is split equally amongst the teams.
The NHL differs from other sports leagues because it also allows indi-
vidual teams to market team products which are sold at venues con-
trolled by the individual team, such as concession stands in the arena,
souvenir stores within a specified area, and mail order catalogs.56 A
percentage of the royalty revenue derived from these sales is placed in
the pool for redistribution and the team retains the rest. 7 Since each
team has a vested interest in its own marketing scheme, they have an
incentive actively to market and promote their individual team.
A powerful team, however, may negotiate a contract in which it
can market its merchandise in an area larger than other teams. For
example, the Anaheim team owned by Disney is allowed to sell its
own merchandise in any of over 200 world-wide Disney stores. Reve-
nue derived from such sales is not subject to redistribution among the
teams. 8 Even though Disney was able to keep the additional revenue
generated from sales of its team merchandise, Mighty Ducks mer-
chandise licensed by the NHLP still accounted for approximately 80%
of royalty revenue at various times during the 1993-94 season. 9
4. National Basketball Association (NBA)
In the NBA, shared revenue can be the difference between mak-
ing a profit or operating at a loss. 60 It has been estimated that the
revenue from shared sources keeps twenty of the twenty-seven NBA
teams operating at a profit.6 '
54. Robyn Norwood, League's Arrangement Gives the Whole Store to Disney; Market-
ing: Company is Given Unprecedented Allowances and Veto Power Over Ducks' Merchan-
dise, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1993, at C6.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Thomas S. Mulligan, Financial Impact of Lockout Different for Kings and Ducks;
Hockey; With Play Resuming, NHL Clubs will be Trying to Recoup their Losses in a Hurry,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, Sports at 2.
58. See Norwood, supra note 54, at C6.
59. Jerry Zgoda, Mighty Ducky: Disney's Marketing Genius is Just What the Hockey
Doctors Ordered, STAR TRIB., Jan. 9, 1994, at 12C.
60. Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1346.
61. Id.
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Merchandise revenue is split evenly amongst the teams.62 The
league maintains control over each team's trademarks and logos
outside of each team's own arena. Each team has very limited rights
in terms of marketing merchandise with an NBA or team logo.63
Teams at the top of their divisions generally have higher revenues
than teams that are consistently at the bottom of the league.64 Gener-
ally, the disparity in team revenue affects the on-court competition.
This disparity is enhanced by the fact that there is no sharing of gate
receipts. Thus, a winning team generally has a higher number of fans
attending the game, which increases its gate revenues and allows it to
maintain a competitive team with better-than-average players.
The largest source of shared revenue comes from fees obtained
from agreements with NBC and TNT for broadcasting rights.66 By
pooling these rights, the teams do not compete in an area which they
might otherwise need to compete.67 Broadcast revenues are split
evenly. Each team contributes a certain number of games to a league
pool which is then sold as part of a package to a television network.68
The league negotiates national network contracts, national cable con-
tracts, and regional cable contracts.69 Each team, however, may indi-
vidually negotiate the television broadcast of "up to half (41) its
regular season games, home or away, over any commercial over-the-
air television station other than a superstation located in its 'home
territory.""'7 In 1990, of the $8.5 million distributed to each team by
the league, $6.8 million (80%) was attributable to the revenue from
national television contracts negotiated by the league.71
The difference in the extent of revenue sharing has different ef-
fects on each league and creates different operating environments for
management to work within. For example, with football's extensive
revenue sharing, 90-95% of a team's revenue comes from shared
sources. Management is not as burdened with generating revenues
with which to field a team. Rather, it is concerned with working
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1339.
64. Id. at 1341.
65. See id. at 1341-42.
66. Id. at 1340.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1344.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1340.
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within the parameters of the salary cap 72 while still fielding a winning
team. With a team's economic survival not necessarily at stake, man-
agement can focus on fielding as competitive a team as possible, which
in turn will increase the team's profits. In contrast, where only 15-
50% of an NBA team's revenue is derived from shared sources, man-
agement must field a competitive team not only to win on the court,
but also to generate fan attendance at games so as to increase the
team's revenues and allow the franchise to remain economically
viable. 73
C. Arguments for Revenue Sharing
Revenue sharing is an important component in the survival of
each individual team as well as the league as a whole. The sharing of
revenues is essentially a cross-subsidization. It will: (1) provide
franchise stability, (2) ensure competition between the teams, (3) pro-
vide geographic balance, and (4) benefit the players.
Revenue sharing is important as a strong base for franchise stabil-
ity; it provides a competitive as well as geographic balance within a
league.74 Revenue sharing allows teams that are not at the peak of
their game to remain financially stable enough to field a competitive
team and survive.75 Congressional studies have shown that revenue
sharing is an "effective means of preserving balanced competition
within a sports league. "76
It has been argued that the only value derived from sports teams
is the enjoyment gained from watching two teams involved in a com-
petitive contest.77 However, if the teams are consistently uneven, that
is, the teams in larger markets with more money are consistently the
dominant teams, even the most loyal sports fan will begin to lose in-
terest.78 Revenue sharing works toward the goal of ensuring that each
franchise, regardless of the size of the market, has a chance to field a
competitive team.79 For instance, in the NFL, revenue sharing has al-
lowed teams from cities like Green Bay, Kansas City, and New Orle-
72. In the NFL there is a maximum amount of money that each team can spend on
player salaries. Vic Carucci, Reality of 'Cap-Matics', THE SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 28, 1994,
Football at 32.
73. Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754 F. Supp. at 1341.
74. Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 2784 and S. 2821 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1982) (statement of Pete Rozelle,
Commissioner, National Football League) [hereinafter Rozelle Statement].
75. Id. at 61.
76. Id. at 62.
77. SCULLY, supra note 27, at 75.
78. Jacobs, supra note 32, at 33-34.
79. Rozelle Statement, supra note 74, at 61.
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ans to field teams that are competitive with teams from Los Angeles,
Chicago, and New York.8"
Also, national geographic balance is furthered through revenue
sharing.8' Without revenue sharing, smaller communities could not
field teams, leaving teams only in big cities.8 2 In support of revenue
sharing, George Halas stated in testimony to the House Judiciary
Committee that "[t]he current league would not exist today without
such practices. 8 3
Not only does revenue sharing benefit the teams, it also benefits
the players.84 Revenue sharing ensures that small-market teams can
effectively compete with large-market teams. Consequently, the
number of franchises has increased over the years, thereby increasing
the number of players that can play professional sports.85 Thus, reve-
nue sharing has become "[t]he principle basis of the league's ability to
offer comparable employment opportunities and economic rewards at
each team location. '86 Revenue sharing benefits all teams in a league,
giving smaller teams the resources to remain in existence, and thereby
increasing, or at least maintaining, the overall output of the league
product.87
D. Arguments Against Revenue Sharing
Revenue sharing is harmful because teams that are able to earn a
profit subsidize the smaller teams who essentially get a free ride on
the success of the larger market teams. Revenue sharing harms the
league structure and individual teams because it: (1) reduces competi-
tion, (2) reduces incentives for the teams to earn a profit, (3) reduces
player salaries, and (4) adversely affects league expansion.
80. 131 CONG. REC. S17,724-02 (1985).
81. Rozelle Statement, supra note 74, at 61.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 62. George Halas was the Chairman of the Board and President of the Chi-
cago Bears and head of the League Expansion Committee. See Antitrust Policy and Pro-
fessional Sports: Overnight Hearings on H.R. 823, H.R. 3287, and H.R. 6467 Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House of Representatives Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 173 (1982); HARRIS, supra note 28, at 11.
84. Rozelle Statement, supra note 74, at 62.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Glen Seredynski et al., Perspective, On Team Relocation, League Expansion, and
Public Policy: Or Where Do We Put This Hockey Franchise and Why Would You Care?, 4
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 663, 695-96 (1994).
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Revenue sharing does not promote competition amongst the
teams, rather it eliminates any economic incentive for a team to win.88
The incentive to win is lessened because, win or lose, a team will re-
ceive an equal fraction of the shared revenue.8 9 There is a fear that by
taking away a team's incentive to obtain larger economic profits by
winning, team management will become lax and the effort put into
promoting a team will be minimal at best.9" If the promotion of teams
ceases, fan interest and support is likely to decrease.91
Revenue sharing may also reduce player salaries. Critics have ar-
gued that revenue sharing adversely affects player mobility because it
removes all incentive for an owner to bid for a particular athlete's
services.92 If an owner has no economic incentive to put together a
winning team, the premier athletes will not be paid their true market
value.
Expansion may also be adversely affected by revenue sharing.
Existing teams will not want to allow more teams into the league be-
cause more teams effectively cut down each team's revenue percent-
age.93 Television revenue for individual football teams will decrease
in the 1995 season because there are two new teams in the league.
Therefore, each team will receive 1/30th of the revenue rather than
the 1/28th received in 1994.
The joint agreements that serve as the basis for revenue ,sharing
raise a number of antitrust questions. Opponents of revenue sharing
believe that joint agreements are anti-competitive and should be con-
88. 2 Inquiry Into Professional Sports: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on
Professional Sports, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 403 (1976) (statement of Edmund G. Fitzgerald,
owner of Milwaukee Brewers) [hereinafter Fitzgerald statement].
89. Garvey Statement, supra note 45, at 36.
90. 2 Inquiry Into Professional Sports: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on
Professional Sports, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1976) (remarks of Rep. B.F. Sisk).
91. Fitzgerald Statement, supra note 88, at 105.
92. Upshaw Statement, supra note 29, at 105.
93. Id. This argument is diminished in that expansion in each of the leagues has oc-
curred more frequently over the past several seasons than it had in previous years (NFL-
Carolina Panthers and Jacksonville Jaguars-1995; MLB-7Colorado Rockies and Florida
Marlins-1993; Phoenix Diamondbacks and Tampa Bay Devil Rays-1998; NHL-San
Jose Sharks-1991; Ottawa Senators and Tampa Lightning-1992; Anaheim Mighty Ducks
and Florida Panthers-1993; NBA-Miami Heat-1988; Minnesota Timberwolves and Or-
lando Magic-1989; Toronto Raptors and Vancouver Grizzlies-1995.). Dirk Patrick, Dol-
lars Expand With Each New Team/Franchise Moves Might Be the Next Agent of Change,
USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1994, Sports at 10C.
Despite expansion, teams still receive significant funds. The large franchise fee col-
lected when a team enters a league, as high as $140 million in football, is divided among
the existing owners, somewhat lessening the impact they will feel from the slightly de-
creased revenue share percentages. Id.
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demned under the antitrust laws, while advocates of revenue sharing
believe that the agreements are not anti-competitive.
Ill
Antitrust Law
Sections one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman
Act) provide the basis for federal antitrust laws. Congress passed the
Sherman Act as a deterrence to the creation of monopolies, which
discourage economic competition by creating unreasonable restraints
on trade.94 The antitrust laws are meant to encourage competition in
the marketplace and to discourage anti-competitive conspiratorial
practices among competitors.95
There are two possible ways to show a violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act-a showing of per se illegality or a finding of a viola-
tion under the rule of reason test.
Fundamental to the per se rule is the rationale that the facts under-
lying certain conduct such as price fixing... division of markets...
group boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal.., and other "naked
restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition,"
need not be examined on a case by case basis. These types of agree-
ments or practices "because of their pernicious effect on competi-
tion and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal .... 96
In addition; a per se violation will be found if the coercive conduct has
a direct adverse effect on competition rather than simply an incidental
effect.
97
Under the rule of reason test, however, the coercive conduct is
examined on a case-by-case basis to determine if it was, in fact, anti-
competitive and the plaintiff sustained injury to a relevant market.98
Therefore, under the rule of reason test, coercive conduct will with-
stand antitrust scrutiny if it is shown that the conduct was in fact pro-
competitive.99
Sports leagues have presented the courts with numerous
problems in terms of applying the antitrust laws, and there has been a
94. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
95. Id.
96. Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 15 (1958)).
97. Id. at 1300.
98. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (original formulation of
the rule of reason test); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (the
classic approach to rule of reason analysis).
99. See Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. 231; Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 754
F. Supp. at 1359-62.
1995]
disparity in the treatment of the leagues. The Supreme Court granted
baseball an exemption from the antitrust laws. Both the courts and
Congress have been reluctant either to repeal the baseball exemption
or extend it to other leagues. 100 The Supreme Court has been reluc-
tant to withdraw baseball's exemption, even though the Court has
stated that the reasoning of the original decision was flawed. The
Court has stated that Justice Holmes' original analysis of whether the
business of baseball is interstate commerce is inadequate given the
nature of the sport. 10'
A. Baseball
Baseball's current antitrust exemption dates back to 1922, when
the Supreme Court declared in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs'0 2 that baseball was
not interstate commerce and, therefore, not subject to the antitrust
laws. Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court, stating that the
playing of a baseball game was not trade as the term was commonly
used and the crossing of state lines was merely incidental to, and not
the primary aspect of, the game.10 3 Consequently, baseball was
deemed outside the scope of the Sherman Act.'0 4
Including the 1922 case, the Supreme Court has heard three base-
ball cases and two other sports cases dealing with antitrust exemption.
In each of the baseball cases, the Supreme Court refused to overturn
Federal Baseball despite the Court's recognition that the Federal Base-
ball decision was analytically flawed.' 0 5 In Flood, the Court reasoned
that since the business of baseball developed and expanded relying on
the exemption granted to it in 1922, more harm would come from
forcing baseball to completely restructure its established system than
overruling a decision that no longer makes analytic sense.'0 6 In the
100. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953). Currently there is legislation before Congress to remove baseball's antitrust
exemption. Baseball Players Aim for Antitrust Change: Union Chief Offers to End Strike,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 1995, at A5.
101. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356; Flood, 407 U.S. at 258. The crossing of state lines to
play games, and the broadcasting of games across the nation are a few examples of why
baseball is in fact interstate commerce and therefore subject to regulation by Congress. Id.
at 58 (Burton, J., dissenting).
102. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
103. Id. at 209.
104. Id.
105. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356; Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
106. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
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other two cases, the Court refused to extend the exemption to football
and basketball. 10 7
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,"°8 the Court upheld Fed-
eral Baseball "[s]o far as that decision determines that Congress had
no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of
federal antitrust laws."' 1 9 In Flood v. Kuhn, the Court again upheld
the exemption for baseball stating that even though the exemption
was illogical and an aberration confined to baseball, it was a matter
for Congress to correct and not for the Court to address." 0 In a re-
cent case, however, the District Court in Florida has ruled that base-
ball's antitrust exemption applies only to the reserve system and not
to all aspects of baseball."' The validity of this argument has yet to
be tested in a higher court, and it is therefore unclear how other
courts will react to this argument.
Congress has considered the extension of the antitrust exemption
to other sports; however, no such bill has ever passed both houses."12
At the present time, Congress is considering removing baseball's anti-
trust exemption by statute. Since the Supreme Court has refused to
do so, Congress must act if baseball is to be brought in line with the
other sports leagues.
B. Other Sports Leagues
The three other major sports leagues do not share the same anti-
trust exemption that baseball currently enjoys, thereby leaving them
subject to the antitrust laws. 1 3 Baseball's antitrust exemption has
been tested by other leagues, but the Court has refused to extend the
exemption. In Radovich V. National Football League, a Clayton Act
case, the Court stated:
[s]ince Toolson and Federal Baseball are still cited as controlling au-
thority in antitrust actions involving other fields of business, we now
specifically limit the rule there established to the facts there in-
volved, i.e., the business of organized professional baseball. As long
as the Congress continues to acquiesce we should adhere to-but
107. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, reh'g denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957); Haywood v.
NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
108. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
109. Id. at 357.
110. Flood, 407 U.S. at 284.
111. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 421 (E.D. Pa.), cert denied to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir., 836 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
112. See Radovich, 352 U.S. 445, 450 n.7; Flood, 407 U.S. at 281.
113. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-84.
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not expand-the interpretation of the Act made in those114
cases ....
The Court stated that "[t]he volume of interstate business involved in
organized professional football places it within the provisions of the
Act." '115 The Court stated that if radio and television transmissions
are substantial, the commerce requirement of the Antitrust Act would
be met.1 16 While this observation by the Court is directly in conflict
with Justice Holmes' analysis in Federal Baseball, it is nevertheless a
more accurate portrayal of the realities of sports. If the criteria for
being subjected to the antitrust laws enacted by Congress is interstate
commerce, sports leagues provide a perfect example of interstate
commerce.
1. Characterization of Sports Leagues
How should the leagues be dealt with in terms of antitrust scru-
tiny? The characterization of sports leagues will determine the extent
to which, if at all, the antitrust laws are applicable. Some commenta-
tors argue that sports leagues should be characterized as single enti-
ties." 7 Single entities are not subject to the antitrust laws because a
single entity cannot conspire against itself. Another approach would
be to characterize sports leagues as joint ventures. 118 Questionable
agreements of joint ventures are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the
rule of reason.' 19 The characterization of leagues as either single enti-
ties or joint ventures is often the key determinant in whether antitrust
laws will apply to sports leagues in a given situation.
a. Sports Leagues as Single Entities
The Supreme Court has held that a parent corporation and its
wholly owned subsidiary are considered a single actor and cannot con-
spire against itself; therefore, it is not subject to the same restrictions
as independent actors that conspire to control the marketplace.12
0
Under the current system, a sports league is a single entity for pur-
poses of certain contracts, but not for others. For example, teams join
together to form agreements on the rules of the game,' 1 1 but are com-
114. 352 U.S. at 451. See also Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205 (stating that "Basketball ...
does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust law.").
115. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452.
116. Id. at 435.
117. Van Glish, supra note 21, at 84.
118. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff d, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1971), aff d, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Hawkins v. NBA, 288 F. Supp. 614, 621 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
119. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
120. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
121. Jacobs, supra note 32, at 31-32.
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pletely independent for other contracts, such as player contracts and
stadium leases.122 The courts have found, however, that professional
sports leagues are not single entities for purposes of federal antitrust
law, and, therefore, can be held liable for unreasonable restraint of
trade.123 Even though the leagues do not have the single entity de-
fense available to them, all joint agreements and restrictions placed on
teams will not necessarily be considered violations of the antitrust
laws. 24 If agreements or restraints enhance competition rather than
hinder competition, they will survive "section 1 scrutiny under the rule
of reason test.' 125
Even though courts have found that sports leagues are not single
entities, they have conceded that they are unique economic forms.126
"The NFL is a unique business organization to which it is difficult to
apply antitrust rules which were developed in the context of arrange-
ments between actual competitors .... We believe antitrust principles
are sufficiently flexible to account for the NFL's structure.' 1 27 If a
sports league is not treated as a single entity, another option would be
to characterize the league as a joint venture.
b. Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures
A joint venture is the combination of a number of single business
entities which join together and form an alliance through agreements
for the purpose of producing a particular product. Some courts have
found that sports leagues are joint ventures, while others have found
that a sports league is neither a pure single entity, nor a pure joint
venture.128 In 1991, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois found in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partner-
ship v. NBA129 (Chicago Bulls) that sports leagues are considered to
be hybrids of joint ventures and single entities: entities which are not
quite joint ventures and not quite single entities, and which, therefore,
are subject to the rule of reason test.' 30 The court found that in spite
of the
122. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1992).
123. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1386-90 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). The courts decided in this manner because the
restraints could hinder competition between teams.
124. Van Glish, supra note 21, at 92.
125. Id.
126. Los Angeles Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1387-90.
127. Id. at 1401.
128. Jacobs, supra note 32, at 31-32; Chicago Prof Sports Ltd. Partnership, 961 F.2d at
672.
129. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. I11. 1991).
130. Id. at 1340.
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[s]ubstantial economic collaboration among the teams, the NBA is
only a partially integrated venture. The level of contractual integra-
tion among the teams lies somewhere between what would be toler-
ated under the antitrust laws among wholly separate firms, on the
one hand, and what one would expect from a fully merged or inte-
grated firm on the other.1 31
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's opinion. 132
It appears from court rulings that the characterization of a sports
team will depend on the nature of the agreement in question. If the
agreement relates strictly to the rules of the game or a similar matter,
the league is generally considered a single entity without antitrust im-
plications; however, if the agreement is more economic in nature, and
that agreement shows an anti-competitive effect and injury to a rele-
vant market, the single entity defense breaks down and the league is
subject to the antitrust laws. The nature of a sports league does not
lend itself to being characterized as a single entity because a league
has characteristics of both a single entity and a joint venture; however,
there should be more consistency among the courts in defining situa-
tions in which leagues will be considered joint ventures or single
entities.
IV
Possible Solutions to the Merchandising Dilemma
With merchandise sales accounting for nearly $3 billion dollars
per year in revenue for each of the four major sports leagues, a uni-
form system for handling licensing contracts within each league has
become more important. Using history as a guide, there are two likely
scenarios for the future: (1) Congress will get involved and pass a law
similar to the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA), or (2) the joint mer-
chandising agreements will be dissolved and, in effect, lead to the dim-
inution of the leagues as they exist today. Before either scenario
becomes reality, problems inherent with each situation will need to be
addressed. In lieu of adopting either of the extreme positions, there is
a median scenario that would benefit all the parties: the licensing arm
of each league could handle the merchandise licensing and collect the
royalty revenue for equal distribution among the clubs as they cur-
rently do, but at the same time, each team could be allowed to market
its own logo, placing a percentage of the extra revenue in the shared
revenue pool and retaining the rest.
131. Id.
132. Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (find-
ing that the league restrictions on the number of games that could be telecast on supersta-
tions was a violation of the antitrust laws under the rule of reason test).
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A. Congressional Intervention
If Congress were to intervene and essentially create an antitrust
exemption for merchandise licensing, it would most likely utilize the
SBA as a model. The SBA created an antitrust exemption allowing
each of the four major leagues to negotiate national network broad-
casting contracts for each league as a single entity.' 33
1. Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA)
In 1961 Congress passed the SBA, which allowed the four major
sports leagues the right to act as four individual cartels and sell the
television rights for their league in a single package. 134 The SBA al-
lows each league to negotiate a national television contract as a single
entity without being subject to judicial scrutiny under the antitrust
laws.' 35 Congress enacted the SBA with the intention of assisting
smaller-market teams, who did not have the bargaining power to ne-
gotiate their own television contracts, as well as enhancing the effi-
ciency of sports leagues by allowing them to bargain as a single unit
and negotiate a television rights deal that would benefit all parties. 36
Congress determined that the networks would also benefit because
they would receive increased revenues from higher fees collected from
sponsors if they could negotiate one deal that presented various
scheduling options as opposed to only catering to the large market
areas.
137
If each franchise were left to shift for its financial and marketing self
in the matter of television.., the ensuing division into rich and poor
would give a few big market franchises enormous advantages as tel-
evision grew. This would cause a corresponding imbalance on the
field, greatly lessening the marketability of the product created by
the league as a whole. That kind of situation would only cost every-
body money in the long run.138
When Congress passed the SBA, it stated that the Act was intended to
provide "'the weaker clubs of the league [with] continuing television
income . . . on a basis of substantial equality with the stronger
clubs."" 39 Congress stated that preserving competitive balance ulti-
mately serves the public interest because if there is not competitive
and geographic balance among the teams, "[tjhe leagues and their
133. Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
134. ZIMBALIST, supra note 16, at 151.
135. Van Glish, supra note 21, at 98.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. HARRIS, supra note 28, at 14.
139. Rozelle Statement, supra note 74, at 61.
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weak teams are unable to attract and hold the public interest which is
necessary for their survival. 140
The SBA, however, does not create a blanket exemption for all
television contracts; it only protects the league from antitrust scrutiny
if the contract was negotiated by the league on behalf of all the
teams. 141 There have been instances in which the league has under-
gone antitrust scrutiny for imposing restrictions on individual team
television contracts because the action by the league was not part of a
negotiated contract, but, rather, was an imposition of restrictions on
an individual team's ability to negotiate its own contract. 42 There are
a number of alternative ways in which the SBA could have been writ-
ten which would have reduced the antitrust litigation centered around
the SBA. If the SBA is to be used as a model for future legislation,
these concerns must be addressed.
2. Merchandising Legislation Expanding on the SBA Model
If Congress takes action, the SBA should be used as a starting
point; however, changes should be made. For example, the SBA
states that it covers only those rights that are national and negotiated
by the league as a whole.' 43 An interesting question arises in'relation
to superstation telecasts of games because they can reach the entire
nation, yet the contracts are negotiated by individual teams. A local
team's television market may be infringed upon because of a "super-
station" telecast. Yet, since it is not a national league contract, the
SBA does not offer recourse.
The "superstation" problem arises in the merchandising context
when corporations like Disney own sports teams and have the re-
sources to sell licensed merchandise in stores all over the world, as
opposed to selling only in their geographic area. A possible solution
would be to specifically include or exclude individual team national
contracts from antitrust scrutiny. If the Act were to exclude such con-
tracts, the league would not be able to impose restrictions on the area
in which merchandise may be sold. Otherwise, such a rule would be
subject to antitrust scrutiny and would probably suffer the same fate
as the NBA's rule in Chicago Bulls. If the legislation were to include
individual team national contracts, the league would be able to impose
restrictions and remain immune from antitrust scrutiny.
140. Id. at 62.
141. Van Glish, supra note 21, at 99.
142. See Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
143. Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
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In the merchandising context, if the legislation aims to cover not
only the contracts negotiated as a league but also those outside of a
certain geographic radius from the home arena of the sports club, the
league may be able to set more rigid rules to avoid the analogous
superstation problem and not be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
When drafting the merchandising legislation, Congress would
need to take all these factors into account in order to avoid further
antitrust litigation down the road.
B. Dissolution of Joint Agreements
Another potential future for merchandise licensing would be the
dissolution of joint licensing agreements. In this case, each team
would be left to negotiate its own merchandise licensing contract
rather than have the league handle the negotiations. Teams in large
markets would benefit the most because they would have the re-
sources and the bargaining power to negotiate lucrative merchandis-
ing deals. Teams in smaller markets would have to put resources they
do not have into marketing their team. It would be difficult for
smaller market clubs with weak competitive teams to obtain licensing
deals with manufacturers because many manufacturers would be un-
willing to take risks on teams having difficulty generating a sufficient
fan base to purchase merchandise with the team logo.
1. Merchandise Licensing Upheaval in the NFL
144
Jerry Jones, the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, has stated that he
intends to reclaim the rights to the Cowboys logo when the NFL
Trust 145 expires after the 2003 season. 146 Jones believes that each
team should be allowed to market its own logo and retain a larger
portion of the profits for itself.147 In 1994, merchandise bearing the
Cowboys logo accounted for 24.3% of total merchandise revenue, and
Jones believes that he is entitled to what he feels is his fair share
rather than split the royalties evenly with the 29 other teams in the
league.' 48 Jones believes that each individual team would be able to
market its own merchandise more effectively than the league cur-
144. As of publication, the NFL has filed suit against Jerry Jones, and he has
countersued. Rights to merchandising revenues is one of the main issues in contention.
145. The NFL Trust was created by the teams when the NFLP was formed in 1963 and
renewed in 1983. Each team signs an agreement which gives the NFLP the exclusive right
to a team's trademark and logo. Rick Gosselin, Jones Sets His Sights on 2004; Cowboy
Owner Seeks Trademark, DALLAS MORNING STAR, Aug. 16, 1995, Sports Day, at lB.
146. Id.
147. McGraw, supra note 42, at 74.
148. Gosselin, supra note 145.
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rently does because each team knows its individual market better than
the central league office. 149 However, the popularity of one team is
due to its success on the field against other teams; in order for compe-
tition to exist, other teams must exist and they must be competitive.
Art Modell, owner of the Cleveland Browns, disagrees with Jones and
believes that the logo merchandise sells because it is symbolic of the
competition between the teams rather than one team's success. 50
A team's marketing success will depend on any combination of
three factors: (1) success in the league, (2) a strong logo, or (3) colors
that are in high demand. 151 Even though a team may know its own
market better than the league licensing agent, a team on top does not
remain on top forever. The cyclical nature of sports allows for one
team to be good for a while; however, the high rate of player and
coaching staff turnover essentially assures that one team will not re-
main on top forever. Because of this cyclical nature, entrusting a li-
censing program solely to each individual team could ultimately be
disastrous for some teams. 152
The Colorado Rockies, Anaheim Ducks, and San Jose Sharks are
all examples of success due to the second two factors. When the
Sharks and Rockies entered their leagues, hockey and baseball re-
spectively, they were among the national leaders in sales despite hav-
ing mediocre first seasons. 153 The Rockies and the Sharks were
immediately successful in merchandise sales because of their uniform
colors, purple and teal, respectively (the Ducks' ability to sell mer-
chandise can be attributed to their logo and the marketing skills of the
Disney corporation). 54 Each of these factors plays an important role
in the successful marketing of a team; however, each requires a large
amount of human and monetary resources, something that many
smaller market teams do not possess. Shared licensing revenue pro-
vides an important source for this much needed capital.
If Jones persists and succeeds in dismantling the joint licensing
program, the consequences for some teams would be extremely grave.
Ultimately, this could lead to a decrease in the number of teams in the
league, because those teams in smaller markets that rely on shared
revenue would be forced to stop operations due to a lack of financial
149. Michael Hiestand, Jones Wants to See Merchandise Profits, USA TODAY, Sept. 20,
1994, at 1C.
150. Id.
151. Mark Albright, In Merchandise Sales, The Bucs Stop Here, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at 1H.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Zgoda, supra note 59, at 12C.
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resources. Jones states that he is not anti-revenue sharing and that he
only wants to retain this small portion of the revenue pie. 155 How-
ever, if the successful revenue sharing that is currently in place begins
to be dismantled piece-by-piece, a trend towards the dissolution of
revenue sharing may be started. If Jones takes this one small portion
of revenue from the revenue sharing pie, what is to keep him or an-
other owner from removing another piece of the revenue sharing pie?
Ed DeBartolo Jr., owner of the San Francisco 49ers, stated, "[i]f we let
the mavericks go out on their own, they'll destroy the league ....
Down the road the league will die."' 56
Since revenue sharing is essential to the survival of smaller mar-
ket teams, and the joint licensing agreements supply, and will continue
to supply, a significant amount of money to certain team revenues, it
is important to maintain the collective agreements.
C. Potential Solution
One possible solution to the merchandising dilemma would be for
leagues to jointly license the merchandise for sale on a national and
international scale and then allow each team to market their own logo
at a local level. The NHL has a similar practice; however, unlike the
NHL, a standard fee should be imposed rather than specifying a cer-
tain area in which the merchandise can be sold. Also, individual
teams should not be allowed to strike their own deals with the league,
as was the case with the powerful Disney Corporation. The league
could then charge a supplemental fee on those extra sales which
would be added to the distribution pool. This practice would supple-
ment the revenue income of the league and reward those teams whose
merchandise sells well, due to either effective marketing by manage-
ment or by simply having a good, competitive team, while not aban-
doning those teams that depend on the additional revenue. This is
analogous to the superstation revenues generated by teams outside of
the national network contracts. However, unlike the scenario in Chi-
cago Bulls, where the league restricted the number of games instead
of placing a restriction on the area in which a team licenses its mer-
chandise, the league would simply impose a fee on the revenue ob-
tained by those clubs on sales outside the national contract.
MLB handles its superstation contracts in a similar manner.
There is a fee charged on the revenue received from superstation con-
tracts rather than a restriction on the number of games that can be
155. Gosselin, supra note 145, at lB.
156. Gary Swan, DeBartolo Rips Cowboys' Owner Jones, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 23, 1995, at
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televised on a superstation. 157 Even though this practice is not subject
to antitrust scrutiny due to baseball's current antitrust exemption, the
practice in the merchandising context in other sports leagues could
possibly withstand antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason test. It
could be argued that the practice is not anti-competitive, but rather
pro-competitive. Such a practice would be pro-competitive because,
despite the league's primary control over the licensing and marketing
of team logos, it would still allow each team to handle some marketing
on its own. There would not be restrictions diminishing the competi-
tiveness between the teams to actively market and promote individual
teams; and there would be enhanced competition, both on the playing
field because of increased team revenues, as well as between the indi-
vidual teams in terms of marketing and selling team merchandise.
By imposing a fee on additional revenue, all teams would benefit.
The team whose merchandise sells well will benefit from the team's
success on the field or its superior marketing ability. In addition, all
teams will benefit from total increased revenue because the shared
revenue going to the weaker teams, whose poor on-field performances
adversely affect their merchandise sales, will ultimately make the
league stronger and more entertaining for the viewing public.
V
Conclusion
The increase in sports merchandise sales has raised the question
of whether the current system for licensing team merchandise is in-
deed the most effective system. The joint agreements that are integral
to the functioning of a sports league are the best way to handle the
merchandising of team logos. The revenue generated by merchandise
sales is an important element in maintaining a competitive league be-
cause it provides teams that do not have a sufficient revenue base with
the added revenue needed to field a competitive team. Competition is
the heart of sports leagues. Without competition, the appeal of a
sports league is lost.
157. ZIMBALIST, supra note 16, at 50.
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